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Enlargement of  the European Union- the Way Ahead 
(speech  by  Dr  Giinter  Burghardt,  Director  General,  DGlA,  European 
Commission, at Chatham 1-Iouse, 29 January 1998) 
Introduction 
I  am very grateful for the opportunity to speak here today in this famous 
forum. I  have been following the Chatham House research programme on 
European  affairs  with  great  interest,  including  the  recent  report  on 
"Britain,  s  Role in a  Changing Europe"  ..  I  noticed  in  particular  that  the 
chapter on preparing the  Union  for  enlargement recommended that the 
Commission should undertake "an open and detailed examination of the 
institutional functioning of  an enlarged Union". This is <?f course something 
that  was  supposed  to  have  been  discussed  in the  IGC  and  decided  at 
Amsterdam but regrettably  major decisions on institutional reform  were 
ag~  postponed. There is certainly plenty of work here for think tanks like 
Chatham House to undertake; the Commission has  an"'~. will draw on their 
expertise in its own analysis. 
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It seems to 1ne that the political climate in the UK concerning Europe has 
changed significantly and I  read  with  pleasure Mr Blair's speech  in the 
I-Iague last week when he talked of the be.nefits of pooling sovereignty to 
increase Europe's influence in the world. As President Santer said after the 
Presidency-Commission meeting early this month, we very much welcon1e 
·the  UI<.'s  new  constructive  attitude  towards  resolving  the  pressing 
challenges  facing  the  European  Union.  However,  beyond  the  practical 
issue-related new attitude towards Europe just outlined by Mr Henderson, 
we  would  like  to  see Britain  in the  future  in  the  vanguard  rather than 
waiting and seeing whether initiatives such as  the euro  succeeds  before 
JOining. 
The  major  challenge  is  certainly  the  perspective  of an  unprecedented 
enlarge1nent of  the Union to the east and southeast of  Europe and I applaud 
the Foreign Secretary,s desire to ensure "that the ·enlarge1nent process gets 
· off to a flying start". .  I can assure you that this desire is shared at alt levels 
within the  Commission.  Last week the  Con1mission  established  a  Task 
Force  for  the  Accession  Negotiations  under  Mr  van  den  Broek.  My 
Directorate  General  (DG  1  A),  which  played  the  central  role  in  the 
preparation of the Opinions and other enlargement-related Agenda 2000 
work, will continue to deal wi~  relations between the EU and all candidate 
countries,  including  bilateral  issues,  implementation  of  the  Europe 
Agreements and the pre-accession strategies. 
In  my  presentation  today  1  would  like  to  rev1ew  briefly  the  relations 
between the Union and the central  and eastern European countries since 
1989, the present state of  play after Agenda 2000 and the European Council 
in Luxembourg, and to consider the way ahead both for the Union and for 
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the candidates. Although I shaJ I concentrate on the enlargement process, I 
hardly need to remind you that the EU has a much larger agenda, some of 
which Sir Leon Brittan described earlier, which needs to be 1nanaged at the 
same time as enlarge.ment. This includes, on the internal front, the launch of 
the  euro,  tackling  unemployment,  promoting . higher  environmental 
standards,  dealing  with  transnational  crime  ;  and  on  the  external  f'rqnt, 
· building  a  deeper  relationship  with  Russia  and  lJkrain~,  ce1nenting 
transatlantic relations, continuing the reconstruction process in Bosnia., and 
maintaining the momentum in the Euro-Med partnership. 
The Challenge of  Enlargement 
The  present enlargement process  presents  the  greatest  challenge  to  the 
Union since its creation in the 1950s. Our aim must be an Union, enlarged 
and deepened, which allows the Union to play its  role as the anchor of 
stability in the new Europe. If we fail  in this enterprise, then there  is  a 
danger that the integration process itself will be watered down with adverse 
effects  for  all  our citizens.  But if we  succeed,  the  prize  is  great - the 
peaceful and democratic unification of  Europe for the first time in history. 
·When the Iron Curtain collapsed in 1989, followed  by the unification of 
Germeny in 1990 ~d  the disintegration of  the Soviet Union in 1991, there 
was euphoria on both sides,  but also  a  realisat~on of the  extent of the 
proble1ns faced by the newly-liberated states on their way to democratic 
stability and economic reform. Their desire for Westerj,.living standards as 
soon as possible was understandable. But it required a  radical  change in 
economic  organisation and  habits,  as  well  as  the  reconstruction  of their 
political syste1ns.  This  was  all the more difficult  in countries where  the 
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nationalism  and  ethnic  minorities  were  combined  with  social  unrest 
stemming from the economic reforms. 
The progress since 1989, however, has been re1narkable.  But decades of 
state control are not easily shaken of£ Commencing from different points of 
departure, the countries concerned .have made different degrees of  progress. 
The progress has not always been even; there have been setbacks as well as 
advances.  For these countries,  membership  of the European Union  is  a 
central goal ; and it is a goal which has to do with more than foreign and 
security policy, it has  to do with their long-term economic and political 
development. For them,  membership of the Union represents in the first 
place- as it did for Greece, Spain and Portugal- not only public acceptance 
as a member of  the ~uropean  family, but also a means of  consolidating, and 
making  irreversible their den1ocratic  and  economic  reforms.  They  want 
membership of the Union, together with membership of NATO, also for 
reasons of security.  Last,  but not  least,  they  want  to  participate  in  the 
economic  benefits . of the  Union's  Single  Market  and  its  redi~tributive 
policies. One of the main challenges will be to close the large gap which 
exists  between  the  high  expectations  of the  central  and  east European 
countries, and the capacity of  the Union to deliver without weakening itself 
in the process. 
The EU's Response 
The  Union's  respo11:se  to  these  unexpected  shock  waves  and  to  the 
legitimate  aspirations  of the  newly  liberated  countries  was  positive.  At 
Copenhagen in 1993 we gave the historic promise that the associated states 
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of Central and Eastern Europe who so desire shall become members of  the 
Union.  We followed  this up with decisions at Essen in  1994 on the pre-
accession strategy, at Cannes in June 1995 on the financial framework and 
at Madrid in December 1995 on the need to strengthen the Union in order to 
prepare for enlargement. ·rhese decisions provided the basic framework for 
the analysis and proposals ·contained in Agenda 2000. 
Copenhagen was historic because for the fust time in its history the Union 
~rom.ised future  tnembership  to  countries  - even  before  they  officially 
applied for it. N'ot even for the last round of  enlargement, which brought in 
· as members Austria, Sweden and Finland, countries  uniquely well prepared 
and equipped, did we make such a promise. For no other countries has the 
Union created this situation where the question is not whether they will 
join, but how and when ;  and to clarify the latter, Copenhagen defined -
again, for the flist time- the political and economic criteria for membership. 
They relate in the first place to democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
arid the protection of  minorities; and the A1nsterdam sumn1it confirmed the 
·primordial nature of  these criteria by n1odifying the Union Treaty in such a 
way as to make the1n an explicit condition of membership. These criteria 
relate in the second place to the existence of  a functioning market economy, 
and  a  country's  capacity to cope  with  competitive pressures within the 
Single Market.  Thirdly,  they  include the  capacity to  take on the formal 
obligations of  membership, that is the body of  rules and laws known as the 
"acquis''. 
It was not a  surprise that the in-depth examination in the Opinions, which 
considered  both  the  progress  achieved  to  date,  and  the  prospects  for 
progress in the medium term,  showed that some  of these  countries are 
better prepared for membership than others. Son1e  began the transition to 
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chose  tnore  rap~d and  more  far  reaching  reform  strategies  than  others. 
Some have been more .resolute and more robust in implementing reforms. 
This is no reproach but simply a reflection of different historical, political, 
economic and social situations.  Today all are on the right track although 
more time wil1 be needed for results to show through in the countries whose 
commitn1ent to reform is more recent. 
In  Agenda  2000,  the  Commission  stated  that  at  present  none  of the 
applicant countries were fully ready for EU membership; but if  the reform 
process was continued, and in some cases intensified, then five countries, in 
. the mediu1n tenn~ could be able to take on the obligations of  1nembership. 
At the  same time,  the  Commission put forward  a  strategy  designed  to 
ensure that all the  applic~ts will start  ac~ession negotiations as soon as 
they have satisfied the necessary conditions  . 
.  There was no element of discrimination  in these recommendations.  All 
candidates  were  assessed  in  terms  of the  same  criteria  and  the  same 
indicators.  Instead of  glossing over the real differences in performance, the 
·commission developed a comprehensive approach from which no applicant 
is excluded and which will provide each applicant with the support it needs 
to prepare for membership. 
The Luxeritbo.urg European Council · 
At Luxembourg the European Council broadly endorsed the Comn1ission's 
proposals in Agenda 2000 concerning the enlargement process. The Heads 
of State and Government agreed that there should be a) an enlargement 
process  b) an accession process and c) a negotiating process. 
s 
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The centrepiece of the enlargement'  process is the multilateral framewor~ 
of an ·European Conference bringing together all the existing EU member 
states,  plus those European states which actively pursue their candidacy 
and which share the goals of  the Union.  In the first instance this invitation 
has been extended to the ten candidate countries of central  and  eastern 
Europe plus Cyprus and Turkey. The Conference will deal with foreign and 
security  policy,  justice  and  home  affairs,  and  other  areas  of common 
interest, particularly economic and regional co-operation.  The Presidency 
has proposed that the first ·meeting of the Conference will take place on 12 
March in London. 
The accession process will open for eleven candidates- Cyprus and the ten 
central and eastern Europeans - on 30 March with a  meeting at Foreign 
Minister  leveL  The  Accession  Partnerships  will  hopefully  have  been 
finalised by then with a specific pre-accession menu for Cyprus  . 
The  negotiating  process,  involving  bilateral  inter-governmental 
conferences, will open with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia on 31  March. An important part of the work to be 
carried out with these six candidates will be an analytic examination of  the 
acquis ("screening process"). In parallel, the preparation for negotiations 
with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria will be accelerated, 
and will also involve a screening process. 
The accession process is rather like a long motorway journey. Those who 
wish to .arrive safely and  in good thne at their destin,ation, should ensure 
that their car is well prepared and serviced for the j oumey. They should be 
prepared for all eventualities, including the possibility of being overtaken 
on the outside lane, traffic jams, and  breakdowns. For the countries in the 
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accession negotiations, there is now a clear departure time but no one can 
guarantee a definite arrival time for any of  them. 
A  reinforced pre-accession strategy will apply  to  all  the ten central and 
eastern  European  candidates.  The  Com1nission's  proposal  for  the  new 
instrument of  the Accession Partnership as the key feature of  the enhanced 
pre-accession  strategy  was  welcomed  by  the  European  Council  and 
approved at last Monday's General  ~ffairs Council. The Commission is 
now working to prepare the draft partnerships - a process which includes 
discussions with the candidate countries on the broad priorities.  The Phare 
programme will completely com.e  under the framework of the Accession 
Partnerships and focus more on the priorities for accession. There will be 
over 2  billion Ecu available during the  last two years  under the Cannes 
envelope (1988/99). The intention is to engage in a rough 70/30 spJit : 70% 
on  infrastructure  and  measures  to  support  investment,  and  30%  on 
institution building. 
From the end of 1998,  the Con1mission wiU  make regular reports to the 
Council  on  the  progress  of the  candidate  countries.  Measuring  their 
progress against the priorities identified in the Accession Partnership, as 
well as their fulfilment of  commitments under the Europe Agreements, will 
be an important part of  that exercise. 
Future  financial  assistance  will  have  to  be  substantially  increased.  In 
Agenda 2000 the Commission proposed a  doubling of the financial  aid to 
applicant countries  in  the  period  2000-2006, with  3:id  at the  level  of 3 
billion ECU per year, that is 21  billion ECU for the seven year period as a 
whole;  this 3  billion ECU per year is made up of 1.5  billion ECU for 
investment and  institution building,  which  are the new priorities  of the 
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Phare programme, 1 billion ECU from the structural funds, and 500 million 
ECU for the modernisation of  the applicants' agricultural sectors. 
The Commission has also decided to set up - within the  existing Phare 
envelopes - a special fund of 1  00  1v1ECU  for the period  1998 - 1999 for 
those countries not ye~ at the negotiating table. The aim of this "Van den 
Broek  or  catch-up  facility"  is  to  make  available  additional  financial 
resources  to  support ·a  number  of specifically  targeted  priority  areas 
including the cotnpletion of the privatisationlrestructuring of the banking 
sector and of  large state owned enterprises ; the promotion of  foreign direct 
investment; and the fight against fraud and corruption. 
Turkey and Cyprus 
Let me say a few words at this juncture about Turkey and Cyprus. No one 
doubts  the  strategic  importance  of Turkey  in  a  region  of considerable 
importance to the Union. The negative reaction of the Turkish government 
to the conclusions at Luxembourg was, therefore, highly regrettable, and in 
this blunt form, unexpected. The u·nion had 1nade strenuous efforts to take 
Turkish concerns into consideration and had come up with a  fair package 
which included a re-statement of  Turkish eligibility for EU membership at 
the highest level, its inclusion of  Turkey as an active candidate amongst 12 
in the proposed European C0nference, and an enhanced Custo1ns Union, the 
centrepiece  of a  specific  pre-accession  strategy.  Luxembourg  has  thus 
s~tisfied the two main priorities for Turkey. 
There was no question of  discrimination. However, the Copenhagen criteria 
apply to 'Turkey as they do to any other applicant for membership of the 
Union.  I  very  n1uch  hope  that  the  Turkish  goven1ment,  which  has 
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Ill 011 recognised that there are significant deficiencies in meeting these criteria, 
concentrates  on  overcoming  these  problen1s  and  participates  in  the 
Conference.  The  founding  principles  of the  Union  are  tolerance  and 
reconciliation. One cannot force oneself into the EU ; rnen1bership is the 
result of  a  tw~-way  exercise. 
I  also hope that  Ankara recognises the considerabJe  benefits  which EU 
membership would entail for all those living in Cyprus.  We believe that 
Turkish Cypriot participation in  the accession negotiations would be an 
important confident building measure and would facilitate the enlargement 
process by contributing towards a lasting political solution for Cyprus. The 
EU  enlargement  process  and  the  UN  led  effort  for  a  political  and 
constitutional solution for the island are two complementary and mutually 
reinforcing exercises. 
An Inclusive and Global Package 
The  enlargement  package  agreed  at  Luxe1nbourg  is  both  inclusive  and 
global. It is inclusive· in the sense that none of  the applicant countries is left 
out. Whatever stage of the accession process they have reached, whether 
they are in negotiations or not, they will benefit fro1n an increased financial 
effort on the part of the Union.  Once they become metnbers,  they will 
progressively benefit from the Community budget in a similar way as other 
Member  States,  while  those  who  are  not yet  members  will  effectively 
benefit from the fact that the increased aid of 3 millio1.  ~CU  per year will 
be divided up among the smaller nutnber remaining outside. 
The financial envelope which we have proposed assumes that 5 applicant 
countries  and  Cyprus  will  join  in  the  year  2002.  Within  the  overall 
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budgetary limits of 1.27% of EU GDP,  it is  not possible to  go  further, 
taking account of the needs of existing Member States and particularly of 
the aims of  economic and social cohesion. What we propose already impJies 
that  agricultural  refonns  will  be  pursued  in  such  a  way  as  to  limit 
expenditure from the budget and reduce the gap between our price levels 
and those of the applicant countries. Taking account of these factors,  the 
sum  which  we  have  proposed  for  assisting  the  applicant  countries  is 
realistic:  it  will  help them  to  make  the  necessary  preparation,  without 
penalising existing members. 
The package is global, in the sense that it is designed to assist the applicant 
countries in all the fields which were identified as priorities in the Opinions. 
That includes all  the criteria of Copenhagen - political and economic, as 
well as the "acquis" strictly speaking. In this context, one should not forget 
that  a  subsequent  European  Council)  in  Madrid,  highlighted  another 
condition  of membership  which  underpins  aH  the  others,  namely  the 
developn1ent of the administration. In our new approach, we put emphasis 
on measures to build up institutions and to encourage "good governance" in 
the  applicant  countries.  The  transposition  of  EC  rules  into  national 
legislation  by  an  applicant  country  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure  a  good 
preparation for  membership;  without a  public administration  capable of 
ensuring that rules are applied effectively, and monitored fairly, such laws 
will be no more than words on paper. 
In terms of preparation for membership all candidates will need to reform 
their government administration, adapt their lnstitutiorJ..J frameworks, train 
and educate a body of  experts on EU affairs, and prepare society at large for 
. the challenges of operating within a highly complex Europe~n Union which 
is based on the rule of  law. 
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141 013 I  am conscious that  w·e  are  asking much of these countries  by  way of 
preparation. To bring their economies and' public finances into .order, they 
have painful decisions to take on the financing of  pensions, health care, and 
so on. To complete the process of  privatisation, they have to divest the state 
of  its involvement in enterprises, and ensure a "level playing field" in terms 
of competition  within  the  Single  Market.  To  deal  with  problems  of 
·minorities, they need to take measures and find resources. All this and the 
acquis,  too  !  Are  we  asking  too  much  ?  Is  the  Union  too  strict  in  its 
requirements of  these new members? 
TheAcquis 
These are questions with which we shall continue to be faced in the course 
of  the a~cession  negotiations. The Commission has taken a clear position in 
Agenda 2000. We believe that new Memb~r  States should be expected to 
apply, implement and. enforce the acquis on accession, and particularly that 
the tneasures necessary for the extension of the Single Market should be 
applied immediately; transitional measures should be limited in time, and 
shoul9, ensure the progressive integration of the new men1bers.  'Ibis is  a 
position of principle, but one which rests on solid reasons, not simp1y  on 
dogma. 
The first reason has to do with the balance of rights and obligations of 
membership. The most important prize of membership is not access to the 
structural funds, or participation in the agricultural poi  ... :.y  : it is the right to 
a vote and a seat in the Community institutions. This is indeed a precious 
gain, as the last group of new members understood well ; despite the fact 
that they already had privileged access to the Single Market by 1neans of  the 
12 




-+-+-+  TYA~.tl.l.Nu1U.N 
EEA Agreement, they needed to move to the ultimate stage of  membership 
in order to enjoy the right to have a say in decisions on the Single Market 
and  other  n1atters  directly  affecting  them.  For the  same  reasons,  it  is 
reasonable for us  to expect the next new members to apply at least the 
major part of  the acquis and our policies; otherwise, why should they enjoy 
the full rights, which accompany the obligations? 
The second reason has to do with the self-interest of  the new 1nembers. The 
more rapidly they can participate fully and effectively in the Single Market, 
they sooner they can expect to obtain the full benefits. Important gains from 
the  extension  of  the  Single  Market  will  accrue  to  these  count~ies, 
particularly in view of  the growth which it can stimulate in their economies 
which are (in general) s1naller and more rapidly developing then those of 
existing Member States. 
Th~ third reason has to do with the interest of the enlarged Union  as  a 
whole. It is accepted that the Union, to avoid paralysis, must reform and 
strengthen  its  institutions  and  their  functioning  as  a  precondition  tor 
enlargement. The Amsterdam European Council indicated the appropriate 
directions, without detennining the exact measures,  and the Commission 
has recommended in Agenda 2000 that these measures be taken in good 
time before any new member joins the Union. Perhaps the key question in 
the institutional debate is how an enlarged Union will operate on the basis 
of  detnocracy, transparency, subsidiarity and efficiency ?  We expect the 
enlarged Union. to be capable of action and development, all the more so 
since by then the euro will  exist.  That is  why  ne~ me1nbers  joining a 
rapidly evolving Union will need to be capable of effective participation in 
its  major  policies  and  developments,  not  relegated  to  "second-class" 
membership by a series of  opt-outs or excessively long transitional periods. 
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tgJ 01:5 For  these  reasons,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  standards  to  be 
expected for new members should be at a high level, without being unfair or 
unreasonable. This approach goven1ed the Opinions, and should continue to 
gui~e  the  pre-accession  strategy  and  the  accession  negotiations,  the 
objective being to ensure accession in conditions that are satisfactory both 
for the applicant countries and for the Union. Good preparation is of the 
essence, and the actual timetable of accession will depend prin1arlly on the 
progress of  individual countries in making the preparation. 
The Way Ahead 
After Luxembourg, the enlargement process, has moved into a  new gear 
involving difficult decisions  for the  Member States  and the  candidates. 
First, the EU has to decide on some important policy reforms concerning 
agriculture,  structural  funds,  the  budget  and  institutional  reform.  These 
decisions  require  careful  preparation  to  ensure  that  we  maintain  the 
·motnentum of the integration process and the cohesion of the Union. The 
Commission will be making proposals for reform on 18 March. 
Second, we need to launch the negotiations, based on the principle that the 
acquis will be applied on accession. 
Third,  we need a reinforced effort of assistance, for all applicant countries, 
designed to ensure that they take on as much as possible of the acquis in 
advance of men1bership. Accession Partnerships should be in place by the 
end  of March  and  will  be  mirrored  by  the  candidates'  own  national 
accession strategies. 
That is essence of our proposals in Agenda 2000. For those countries whose 
degree of preparation allows envisaging their metnbership in  the mediutn 
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tenn, the start of  negotiations will gradually heJp to grasp the real problems 
and should lower excessive expectations. For those countries who have not 
yet made sufficient progress, not a "waiting room", but a training ground. 
As regards subject areas to commence the negotiations it strikes •ne that the 
Single Market would be a useful starting point. This is an area in which the 
candidates  already  have  some  experience  through the  White  Paper,  the 
Europe Agreements, and their relations with the .. f AlEX oftice. 
Some of  the critical issues likely to figure in the accession negotiations., in 
addition to future financing and institutional refonn, are: 
- agriculture : the problems vary from country to Qountry (Poland/Estonia). 
But the  EU will  have  to  continue  to  reform  the  CAP  - regardless  of 
enlargement - in readiness for the next WTO round 
- structural funds  : the Agenda 2000 proposals provide a  fair  basis  for a 
concentration ~f  aid in present Member States whilst providing gradually 
increasing sums for the new members 
- free n1ovement of labour : a sensitive issue in countries such as Ge11nany 
and Austria. 
- envi!ronment : huge problem area - very costly for candidates to meet EU 
standards 
- EMU : new members will not ~1ave to join the euro, but participate in the 
second stage of  EMU 
- 1'hird Pillar: A1nsterdam decided that new members will have to take on 
Schengen in its entirety - again very costly and complicated 
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Timing 
In the past, the length of accession negotiations has varied considerably. I 
need hardly remind this audience that the UK first applied in 1961  and only 
joined twelve years later. The negotiations with Spain and Portugal lasted 
nearly seven years. Those with the EFTA countries were n1uch  shorter, bJt 
it is important to recall that these were preceded by n1ore than three years of 
tough negotiations to establish the EEA- a process which involved taking 
on board some 60% of  the acquis communautaire. At the time of  the EFTA 
enlargement negotiations, the volume of the acquis was estimated at about 
60,000  pages of the  Official  Journal.  Current  estimates  put  it  at about 
sq,ooo pages of  text, of which about half conce1n agriculture. The 80,000 
pages  contain  about  20,000  legal  acts,  including  approximately  4,000 
Directives, 6,000 Regulations and 10,000 Decisions. 
One enlargement I have not 1nentioned is that of  Greece, but it may provide 
a useful lesson. The military were overthrown in  1974 and Greece joined 
the EU just seven years later. With the· intention of quickly consolidating 
den1ocracy, political  tnotivations had the upper hand  at the expense of a 
solid analysis of  the state of  economic preparedness. 
Conclusion 
I spoke earlier of the unification of the European continent on the basis of 
sharing sovereignty and co1nmon institutions. That is indeed the scale of  the 
task  ·which faces us. The European family is numerous: big and smalJ states, 
· new and old nations - some newly-created on old foundations - and various 
fora.. Tbe Union with 15 members includes less than half of  that family- by 
comparison with the 54 members of the OSCE and the 40 tnembers of the 
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Council of Europe - but the enlargement on which we are embarked will 
bring us to comprise the majority. That will iinply a major .responsibility for 
political and economic order among the members of  the family - including 
those who aspire to membership of  the Union but are not yet able to take on 
the obligations - and also for relations with its neighbours. 
An enlarged Union, with a. population near to 500 mil1ion, and an economic 
product one third higher than that of the USA, must expect to be a major 
provider of economic  assistance  and  political  stability.  It  will  need  to· 
deepen its relations with Russia, the Ukraine, and the Newly Independent 
States. It will need to handle the unfinished business of creating order and 
peace in the  Balkan  peninsula.  For all  these  purposes,  an  efficient and 
credible  common  foreign  and  security  policy  is  indispensable.  In  this 
context I hope that the UK, with its impressive resources in this field, will 
play a more prominent role in future. The projection of  the EU'  s weight on 
the international scene requires both political will and an efficient foreign 
policy machinery. 
In addition, we must encourage regional co-operation in the areas such as 
the Black Sea and the Baltic where the interests of member states and of 
non-members are inseparably involved. Regional forums will become more 
important, not Jess  important, as the Union expands. Talking together and 
acting together to resolve problems is a habit which needs to be fonned in 
preparation for membership of  the Union, not left until after accession. 
The .  creation of a  str.onger European framework for peace, prosperity and 
stability is the ~ajor task for the Union as we approach the year 2000 and 
look beyond it.  I cannot put it better than in the words of Tin1othy Garton 
Ash, a  member  of the Commission on  Britain and Europe, who in 1993 
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f4l 019 concluded his account of German reunification  in the book "In Europe's 
Name" with these prophetic remarks = 
"In the early twenty-first  ce~tury, it is  possible. that at least  part of the 
former Eastern Europe will be an area of  secure 1iberal democratic states co-
operating with  neighbours and partners  in a  Jarger European Union and 
Western Alliance.  It is possible that Polish, Hungarian and Czech citizens 
will have rights, freedoms and life-chance·s comparable to those enjoyed by 
Spanish, Portuguese and Greek citizens in the 1980's.  It is  possible that 
tolerance, pluralism, de1nocracy and the virtues of ever closer co-operation 
will spread from  West to East.  But it is  also possible that intolerance, 
tribalism,  and the forces of  ~isintegration will spread from East to West, 
threatening even the substance of what has been achieved in the European 
Union" 
In the  light of history,  we  can expect  our efforts  to  be judged by this 
measure: did we have the leadership and creativity to rise to this challenge ? 
Did w~ have the right combination of idealism and realism to satisfy the 
aspirations of the  European peoples for  a  wider and stronger Union  ?  I 
believe that Agenda ·2000 provides the right basis for our deliberations, and 
I  am confident that our Member States will ultimately take the necessary 
decisions to ensure a successful enlarge1nent process and to close the gap 
between the rhetoric  and getting the job done.  As Robin  Cook said in 
Strasbourg last week : "The stakes are too high to get it wrong, for both the 
applicants, and the existing members". 
On the eve of  a· new century it is important to reflect on the mistakes of the 
past  - relations  conducted  on  the  balance  of pow~r principle  and  two 
dreadful European civil wars caused by excessive nationalism. For the 21st 
century we n1ust construct a united Europe based on different principles, but 
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principles which have. proved themselves in the past forty years :these are 
tolerance,  co-operation  and  integration  ;  in  other words the  comn1unity 
approach based on sharing sovereignty. 
I am pleased the new ·British government shares these values because it is 
the only solid foundation on which to builc the new Europe "whole and 
free". 
Thank you for your attention. 
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